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THE SPECTRE OF TERRITORIAL DIVISION 
AND THE OHRID AGREEMENT 
 
Eben Friedman1 
 
“Better a terrible end than endless terror.”2 
Grafitto by supporters of VMRO-DPMNE 
 on Skopje’s Mount Vodno  
 
 
On 18 April 2003, the Skopje newspaper Dnevnik published an article by former 
prime minister Ljubčo Georgievski entitled “Theses for Survival of the Macedonian 
Nation and State”. The current document offers a summary examination of 
Georgievski’s position in that article. Additionally, a look at the broader context 
within which Georgievski’s theses appeared provides a case for rapid and careful 
implementation of the Framework Agreement.   
 
Georgievski’s Theses 
Despite having signed the Framework Agreement3 in his capacity as leader of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), Ljubčo Georgievski has distanced himself from 
the document literally from the signing ceremony on 13 August 2001, when he 
displayed outrage at Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH) president Arben 
Xhaferi’s use of Albanian to address the press. On 3 September of that year, 
Georgievski made his position more explicit, stating in parliament that to approve the 
Framework Agreement would send a message that terrorism pays. Georgievski’s 
                                                 
1 Research Associate, European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), Flensburg, Germany. 
2 “Podobro užasen kraj otkolku užas bez kraj.” 
3 Attempting to balance remedies for many of the grievances of Macedonia’s ethnic Albanian 
population with the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity, the Framework Agreement was also 
signed by representatives of the country’s three largest political parties at the time: PDSH, Party for 
Democratic Prosperity (PPD), and Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). For the text of the 
agreement, see http://www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm. 
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clearest statement of his position, however, appeared in his “Theses for Survival of 
the Macedonian Nation and State”, published in the Skopje newspaper Dnevnik on 18 
April 2003.4 
 
Asserting that “[t]he Ohrid Agreement definitively marked the end of a Macedonia 
which we recall from history and from the ideals of all the fallen Macedonian 
patriots”, Georgievski claims that whereas Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar – all of which 
have an ethnic Albanian majority – “no longer constitute a problem” for “the Great 
Albanian strategy” as a result of an Albanian “demographic explosion”. The “next 
places for conquest” by the ethnic Albanian population, he claims, include a set of 
municipalities in which ethnic Albanians constitute a substantial minority. 
Georgievski further laments that “this total ethnic cleansing is covered up by various 
international organizations, and even by governments”. Equating continued 
implementation of the Framework Agreement with continued hopelessness, 
Georgievski grounds a call for territorial division on international experience in cases 
similar to that of Macedonia: “States solve ‘insoluble’ problems either by division or 
by fixing boundaries”. Should the Albanian political parties refuse to take part in an 
exchange of territories and population, Georgievski recommends proceeding “after 
the principle of the Israeli government” in demarcating the border between ethnic 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians with a concrete wall. 
 
While Georgievski does not outline a specific territorial arrangement in his article, a 
reference to “the theses set forth by some academics for exchange of territories and 
population” makes clear that Georgievski’s proposal is not the first of its type. Among 
the predecessors of Georgievski’s theses, the one which received the most attention 
surfaced in May 2001, at a time when fighting between the National Liberation Army 
(UÇK)5 and Macedonian government forces showed no signs of tapering off. 
                                                 
4 “Tezi za opstanok na makedonskata nacija i država”, available at 
http://dnevnik.com.mk/print_statija.asp?pBroj=2130&stID=17187. While the translations used here are 
the author’s, an English translation appeared in MIC Daily News Service, 21 April 2003. 
5 In Albanian, ‘UÇK’ serves as the abbreviation for both the National Liberation Army (Ushtria 
Çlirimtare Kombëtare) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). Rather than 
use the usual Macedonian abbreviation for the National Liberation Army –ONA–, the introduction to 
the Macedonian-language version of the website of the political party formed by National Liberation 
Army leader Ali Ahmeti makes use of the association between the two liberation armies, referring to 
“[t]he glorious struggle of our people organized in the UÇK” (see http://www.bdi-press.org). 
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Defending his own plan as a “document for the salvation of Macedonia”,6 then-
chairman of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) Gjeorgi 
Efremov proposed exchanges of population designed to make western Macedonia into 
a homogeneously ethnic Albanian enclave for eventual cession to Albania. In return, 
Albania was expected to yield to Macedonia a small area of land on the border near 
Lake Prespa with a small ethnic Macedonian population.7 While the division scheme 
was rejected out of hand by the (ethnic Albanian) PDSH and the Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PPD), as well as by the (ethnic Macedonian) SDSM, Georgievski (at the 
time prime minister as well as leader of IMRO-DPMNU), did not denounce the 
proposal. 
 
Responses to the Theses 
Whereas representatives of the SDSM and Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union for 
Integration (BDI) were quick to reject Georgievski’s proposal (as were the 
ambassadors of the EU, NATO, OSCE, and US in Skopje), on 19 April Arben Xhaferi 
announced his resignation from the PDSH for lack of hope for a multiethnic 
Macedonia. In similar fashion, PDSH vice-president Menduh Thaci called the 
Framework Agreement “a dead document”, following up Georgievski’s assessment of 
a day earlier that “[t]he Ohrid Agreement has transformed Macedonia into a patient 
who has already confirmed the diagnosis of his own illness” with the prognosis that 
“Macedonia is like a patient that has survived the first heart attack, but won’t be able 
to survive the next one”.8 Although the PDSH has not issued a statement withdrawing 
its support for the Framework Agreement, the fact that party activities have been 
suspended since Xhaferi and Thaci’s respective statements suggests that the party is in 
disarray. The VMRO-DPMNE, on the other hand, seems to have weathered the storm 
more successfully by electing at the party’s congress on 24-25 May a leader 
supportive of implementing the Framework Agreement. The blocking by the VMRO-
DPMNE deputies of an 11 June parliamentary vote on two laws regulating the use of 
minority languages in state institutions, however, suggests that the change in 
leadership will not effect a radical change in party policy. 
 
                                                 
6 Cited in Venon Latifi, “Storm Over Macedonia Partition Plan”, Balkan Crisis Report, 6 June 2001. 
7 See the various articles published in Dnevnik, Nova Makedonija and Večer, 31 May–1 June 2001. 
8 Thaci cited in Ana Petruševa, “Storm Over Opposition Resignations”, Balkan Crisis Report, 25 April 
2003. 
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Territorial Division vs. the Framework Agreement 
Contrary to Efremov’s claim that the necessary exchanges of population and territory 
could be accomplished peacefully, Georgievski’s recommendation that a wall be built 
if necessary to divide ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian populations accepts the 
possibility of considerable violence in realizing the proposed territorial division. Even 
were such a division to occur without bloodshed, however, it would generate a new 
set of problems likely to further threaten the already tenuous stability of the region. 
On the one hand, cession to Albania of an artificially created ethnic Albanian enclave 
could upset the country’s (sub-)ethnic balance between Ghegs and Tosks.9 On the 
other hand, the loss of territory and population from the Republic of Macedonia 
would call into question the country’s existence not only for reasons of size, but also 
because such truncation could lead to clashes between serbophile and bulgarophile 
elements of the ethnic Macedonian population intent on union with neighbouring 
states already short on administrative capacity.10 Thus, while ethnic partition might 
promise to ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian populations an escape from 
deadlock over the Framework Agreement, such an arrangement would pose a greater 
danger than does wrangling on implementation. 
 
Whatever the impracticability of partition, the fact remains that the Agreement has 
thus far satisfied neither ethnic Macedonians nor ethnic Albanians. On the one hand, 
implementation of the accord has been marked by stalling on the part of ethnic 
Macedonian parliamentarians anxious to set conditions to be fulfilled before 
proceeding with promised reforms. On the other hand, this very stalling has led some 
ethnic Albanians to question ethnic Macedonians’ commitment to implementing the 
Agreement.11 At the same time, significant legislative reforms passed in the first half 
of 2002 provided some basis for the view that the document’s provisions would be 
                                                 
9 Whereas the ethnic Albanian population of Macedonia consists primarily of Ghegs, Albania’s 
political elite is predominantly Tosk. While cession of an ethnic Albanian enclave from Macedonia to 
Kosovo would not present the same risk of imbalance insofar as most of Kosovo’s inhabitants are 
Ghegs, the province’s administrative status renders this a moot point.    
10 While the extent of serbophilia among SDSM supporters and bulgarophilia among members of the 
VMRO-DPMNE is not clear, these orientations constitute genuine currents within the ethnic 
Macedonian population, with the two parties frequently accusing one another of treachery and selling 
out to foreign interests. See, for example, Stojan Andov, “Do koga makedonskoto minato kje go 
preslikuvame vo idninata?”, 3 (42) Forum (2000), 28-30. 
11 Moreover, some representatives of Macedonia’s smaller minorities have expressed concern that 
many of the provisions of the Agreement effectively exclude them by placing them at an increased risk 
of discrimination in a regime emphasizing the rights of the ethnic Albanian population while neglecting 
the country’s other ’communities’. 
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implemented after all, as did the results of the parliamentary elections of 2002, which 
brought to power a governing coalition led by the two parties most in favour of the 
Agreement: the SDSM and BDI. 
 
Conclusion 
Should stalling win out over implementation of the Framework Agreement, support 
within the ethnic Albanian population for radical groups outside of politics could 
increase, and recent converts to the political process might be propelled back into the 
realm of violent action.12 If non-implementation risks provoking violence on the part 
of segments of the ethnic Albanian population, however, so is inexpert 
implementation of the Framework Agreement likely to encourage violence on the part 
of radical ethnic Macedonian groups anxious to capitalize on popular discontent 
associated not only with the terms of the Framework Agreement, but also with the 
country’s dire economic situation. Moreover, both of these scenarios are likely to 
increase support for proposals to partition Macedonia, the liabilities of which have 
been discussed above. Thus, given the alternatives, it is crucial that the provisions of 
the Framework Agreement be implemented competently and in a timely manner.  
                                                 
12 See, for example, Misha Glenny, “Dann kaufen wir neue Waffen”, Profil 20 August 2001. 
